Most privacy pages describe an intention. This describes a route: where a message goes after you press send, what is taken off it on the way, and which parts of it are encrypted when they come to rest — including the part that is not.
How a request travels
A message leaves your device over TLS and reaches our own infrastructure first. It is never sent directly from your device to an AI provider — that indirection is the whole design, and it is what makes the rest of this possible.
Our service holds the provider API keys and does the talking. Your request arrives carrying a signed authentication token; what leaves for the provider carries your question and the name of the model to answer it, and nothing that identifies you. Your account, your email, and your subscription tier are resolved on our side and stay there.
One consequence worth stating plainly: because each request reaches the provider without an account attached, there is nothing on their side to thread two of your questions together into a history.
Encryption
In transit. Everything is TLS, on every platform, with no plaintext fallback.
At rest. Conversations — chat titles and message contents — are encrypted on your device before they are stored, with AES-256-GCM: a 256-bit key, a fresh random initialization vector per record, and an authentication tag that makes tampering detectable rather than silent. The key is derived with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 at 100,000 iterations.
This is not end-to-end encryption, and we will not call it that.
The encryption key is derived from your account identifier, and we hold that identifier. So we are technically capable of decrypting stored conversations. This protects your history against someone reading the database casually, against a stolen backup, and against an operator browsing rows — it does not protect it against us. Any product that can show you your history on a new device, without you carrying a key or a passphrase to it, is in the same position. Most of them describe it as end-to-end anyway.
What is not encrypted. Encryption covers conversations. Notes, reminders, projects and memories are stored unencrypted, protected by the per-account database rules and nothing more. We would rather write that sentence than let you assume otherwise.
On the web. A browser has no keychain and no secure enclave, so the web client stores nothing worth stealing: no history, no memories, no notes, no key. Your conversation lives in the tab and is gone when you close it. History and sync are offered on iPhone and Android, where the operating system can actually guard a key.
Photographs. An image file carries more than the image — the coordinates it was taken at, the device that took it, and the moment it happened. That block is removed on your device as the picture is attached, so it is gone before the upload starts rather than after it arrives.
What this adds up to
- •The provider sees a question, not a customer. No account, no email, no tier — and identifying details inside the message itself are replaced with stand-ins before it goes.
- •We see ciphertext for conversations, and plaintext for the rest. Notes, reminders, projects and memories are not encrypted, and that is a limit rather than an oversight.
- •Nobody should call this end-to-end. Including us.
The shorter reference — what we can see, what we do not have yet, and how to report a vulnerability — is on the security page.